

General Retained

76-00405

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)


Larry Wu-Tai Chin, Analysis of FBIS Documents

FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED
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12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached documents, bearing the initials of Mr. Chin, were located by FBIS. CRD's initial analysis, together with the comments of the FBIS reviewer are forwarded. Additional FBIS material, recovered from Chin's residence is being sent separately.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: NOV 2006




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUPERVISOR (Initials)

Classification Review on the Chin Case

FROM:			EXTENSION	TO:
Chief, Executive and Planning Staff Foreign Broadcast Information Service			2929	FBIS-0010/86
			DATE	8 January 1986
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and date of)		DATE		Comments (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARD		OFFICER'S INITIALS		
1. [redacted] Information Review Officer, DS/ST	[redacted]	(3 Jan 86 E/H)		
2. Room 6545 - Headquarters				
3. DS/ST/ DES		15	E/H	
4. [redacted] (600)/DES				
5. [redacted]				
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS-0010/86  
8 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Information Review Officer, DS&T  
[REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] Chief, Executive and Planning Staff

SUBJECT: Classification Review on the Chin Case

REFERENCE: [REDACTED] Memo of 17 December

1. Reference asked for information concerning the current guidelines for declassifying FBIS Foreign Press Digests. As is correctly surmised in [REDACTED] memo, these documents are classified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED] the original classification authority and, to conform to the general practice that the originating authority have declassification authority, FBIS does not declassify these materials without [REDACTED] approval.

2. The Special Report on Communist Media was classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ for six months because it revealed CIA analytic capability and judgments. These reports are drawn exclusively from overt sources, but the analysts writing them have access to classified materials and some of their judgments may be affected by their classified reading.

3. Please advise me on 331774 whether you wish FBIS to retain the package of documents which accompanied the memo or whether we should return them to [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Classification Review on the Chin Case

AMC

10-4 JAN 1985

FROM: C/ [REDACTED] /CRD/OIS/DA

EXTENSION  
1

NO OIS 85-669

DATE 19 December 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

1. [REDACTED] RO/DSGT  
[REDACTED] 3 Jan 86 EH

2.

3. FBI/EXO  
Rm. 212 Key Bldg.

4.

5.

6.

7.

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1 to 3:

Please review the attached documents as requested by CRD/OIS and return to me with your response.

Thank you,

*[Signature]*

345 - Here are the documents.

give reply

Eto/ren

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]  
17 December 1985

MEMORANDUM: Information Review Officer, DG&T

FROM: [redacted]

Chief,  
Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services, DA

SUBJ/FCT: Classification Review on the Chin Case

1. Attached are four FBIS documents classified CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN. Three are Press Digests, and one is a Special Report on Communist Media. The Press Digests contain no sensitive information since they are from overt sources. The CONFIDENTIAL classification appears to be related to the fact that the compilations reveal US Government reporting requirements. [redacted]

[redacted] Please advise us concerning the current guidelines for declassifying this type of summary. The Special Report was automatically declassified in six months. We assume that the original CONFIDENTIAL classification was because it revealed CIA analytic capability, the extent to which we could cover a particular subject.

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM ATTACHMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

VL  
MBH  
VZ

# Foreign Press Digest

CHINA  
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FB FPD 79-018  
29 June 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

~~Confidential~~



Special Report  
on Communist Media

THE FIFTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

~~Confidential~~

17 MARCH 1978  
FB 78-10005

~~Confidential / NOFORN~~

FPD 0034/78  
29 December 1978

FOREIGN PRESS  
DIGEST

PEOPLES REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA

*Military, Political and Economic Data*



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

~~Confidential / NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

V  
W  
B  
L

# Foreign Press Digest

CHINA  
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

FB FPD 79-020  
22 August 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~


18 December 1978

LOG NOTE of Chief,

[redacted] Division

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~



D- Date: 19 Nov 80

REMARKS:

Return to: HL

Pass to:

Retain or Destroy 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*VJ*

DAILY LOG NOTE OF Acting Chief, [redacted]

14 April 1975

(cc: O/Dir, [redacted])

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOG NOTE, Chief, [redacted]

-- 19 November 1980

(cc: D/FBIS, [redacted])

ORIGINAL CL BY [redacted]  
 DECL EX REVW ON 19 Nov 1986  
EXT BY NDC IRS BY \_\_\_\_\_  
REASON \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOGGED

24 JAN 1986

NES

WS

(b) (3)

23 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

OGC

FROM: OIS/CRD [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: . Larry Wu-Tai CHIN: Analysis of FOIS Documents

1. The attached documents were recovered from the residence of Mr. Chin. We are also attaching a copy of CRD's initial analysis of the documents, together with a memorandum from Director, FBIS, with additional comments concerning the documents.

2. Additional FOIS documents that bear Chin's initials have been examined, both by CRD and by FBIS; these will be the subject of a separate memorandum. Individual security analysis worksheets were not prepared for these FBIS documents (we began that procedure later), nor will they be prepared for those documents which originated with other agencies.

3. The Department of State has completed its review of all State material known to have been in Chin's possession. A copy of the State security analysis has been forwarded to OGC. We will advise you as soon as we receive the response from the Department of Defense concerning its material.

4. Of the 13 additional documents identified by FBIS as having been available to Chin, approximately 73 have been located by OCR. They were unable to find the other 28 documents and personnel at the Agency Records Center are now attempting to locate the remaining documents. The 70 documents have been examined by us and forwarded to DDCI for additional comments. Once the DCI has completed its review we will provide you with the results. Several documents were sent to DIA for review. Their comments will be forwarded upon receipt.

*Karl V Rohrer*

Karl V. Rohrer

Attachments

## SECURITY

## ROUTING AND RECD SHEET

SECTION (Check)

TO WHOM:  
**John D. Chamlee  
 Director, Foreign Broadcast  
 Information Service**

EXTENSION

FBI#

2927

DATE

27 December 1955

FROM (Name, Organization, Room Number, and  
Telephone)DATE  
  
RECEIVED FORWARDEDOFFICER'S  
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom  
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

## 1. INFORMATION REVIEW

OFFICER

A. ROM 6845 - Headquarters

*3 Jan 86*  
*EH**Scam*

<i>4/7/86</i>	<i>6 Jan 86</i>	<i>EH</i>

<i>[redacted]</i>	<i>[redacted]</i>	<i>[redacted]</i>

~~SECRET~~

FBIS-0525/85  
27 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Information Review Officer, DS&T  
FROM: John D. Chandee  
Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
SUBJECT: Classification Review of Compromised FBIS Documents  
REFERENCE: Memo from C. [ ] VCRD/OIS/DA, [ ] 13 Dec 85,  
Same Subject

1. The following references correspond by paragraph to the memorandum indicated above:

a. Five partial performance evaluations. These fitness reports are unclassified and done on each FBIS employee at specified intervals. These individuals were trained at the [ ] Bureau by Mr. Chin. The individuals rated do not have access to security information and are unclassified employees of FBIS. The fitness reports are normally withheld as official data to protect the names of persons, their components, and their duties. However, the information is not classifiable. Their distribution is normally within the bureau with one copy for Headquarters personnel files.

b. Cable marked [ ] 30442 is not a travel order. The names are of overt employees,

c. [ ]

All portions ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Classification Review of Compromised FBIS Documents

[redacted] among the classified officers of the FBIS Bureau, and in Agency and FBIS Headquarters.

d. [redacted] was at the time a GS-12 staff employee at FBIS Headquarters, serving as an intelligence officer with full clearance.

[redacted] Locations of FBIS bureaus are publicly known but lists are considered official data not for public release.

e. The itinerary--with flight numbers, dates, times, and hotels--for [redacted] is indicated in this cable. It would receive circulation at [redacted] FBIS Bureaus indicated, including Agency and FBIS Headquarters.

f. There are several reasons the first cable is properly classified as confidential:

[redacted]  
[redacted] seems to be largely a matter of confidentiality, so would not have been classified except that it related to an employee's performance. Nevertheless, the fact that there is suspicion about the value of an employee might signal the vulnerability of that employee to recruitment by a foreign service.

g. This was not classified material.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Classification Review of Compromised FBIS Documents

- h. Not included in your list but included in the package forwarded, this is a classified State telegram. Recommend State be queried for evaluation.
- 2. I believe all Agency-originated and FBIS-originated documents attached are properly classified



Attachment:  
Reference

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]  
13 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Information Review Officer, DS&T

FROM: [redacted]

Chief, [redacted]  
Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services, DA

SUBJECT:

Classification Review of Compromised FBIS Documents

1. The FBI has recovered several CIA documents from the residence of Larry Chin, a former FBIS employee accused of espionage on behalf of the PRC. The Department of Justice has requested us to authenticate the documents, determine if they are or were properly classified, provide the reason for classification, and determine their distribution and who had access to them. CRD has conducted a preliminary review, and we are forwarding them to you for your review and for any additional comments. We are enclosing the following FBIS documents:

a. Five partial performance evaluations of local hire employees of the [redacted] bureau. These are unclassified documents. They would be withheld under the (b) (3) exemption of the FOIA since the CIA Act of 1949 requires the DCI to protect the names of Agency components and employees. However, we do not believe that the documents are classifiable.

b. FBIS travel order for Chin [redacted] Confidential. [redacted]  
[redacted] and all names appear to be those of FBIS overt employees. This cable does not appear to warrant its confidential classification except for the fact that TDY travel of FBIS employees is classified per se.

c. Cable [redacted] concerning FBIS travel for Chin. Confidential.  
No reason for classification is cited, and the subject matter is not classified except that it pertains to TDY travel.

[redacted]

DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL  
WHEN SEPARATED

SECRET

d. Itinerary for [redacted]

Secret. [redacted]

[redacted] The cable appears properly classified.

e. Itinerary for [redacted]

Secret. [redacted]

[redacted] The documents appear to be properly classified.

f. Two cables concerning progress reporting on FBIS [redacted] monitors, Confidential. Since only FBI installations and personnel appear, these cables contain no classified material.

g. Notes on Chinese military terminology, Official Use Only. Possibly done by Chin himself. It does not appear to be classifiable. [redacted]

2. Additional FBIS documents to which Chin had access in the course of his employment will be forwarded for your review. Justice has requested that CIA classification review be done on a priority basis. [redacted]

Distribution:

Orig - IRO/DEMT w/atts


1 - Office of Security, Attn: [redacted] w/o atts

1 - CDR Liaison w/Office of Security w/atts


1 - CDR Foreign Assessment File w/o atts


1 - CDR Circulate w/o atts


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



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12/3/15

















~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL 222143Z DEC 76 STAFF

CITE: FBI S [REDACTED] 39442  
TO: FBI S.

PETERSON. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: LARRY CHEN, TUT

REF: [REDACTED] 39438

JUST RECEIVED WORD THAT CHEN WILL BE ABLE TO STAY IN  
APARTMENT [REDACTED] WHICH IS WITHIN WALKING  
DISTANCE OF [REDACTED] BECAUSE HE WILL BE PROVIDED  
QUARTERS. CHEN WILL RECEIVE REDUCED PER DIEM. E2, IMPDET.  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

210  
12/12/76

CONFIDENTIAL

\*Not Received

Phil  
12/2/85

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

11  
2  
3  
F.S.  
NO2570  
Key

1. [REDACTED] CS-10, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] DIVISION, FOREIGN  
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, WILL TRAVEL IN YOUR AREA PER ITINERARY  
IN PARAGRAPH 5.

2. PURPOSE OF TRAVEL IS TOY AREA FAMILIARIZATION. PROPOSED  
ITINERARY WILL PERMIT HIM TO VISIT FMIS BUREAUS IN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AND TO GAIN SOME EXPERIENCE IN FIELD MONITORING WORK  
AND OTHER BUREAU OPERATIONS. IT WILL ALSO ENABLE HIM TO DISCUSS  
[REDACTED] DEVELOPMENTS WITH FIELD EDITORS AND  
MONITORS. [REDACTED] STOPOVERS IN THE OTHER CITIES ARE  
FOR AREA FAMILIARIZATION AND FOR SEEKING VARIOUS FAR EAST LANGUAGE  
REFERENCE WORKS IN LOCAL BOOKSTORES.

3. [REDACTED] WILL TRAVEL. [REDACTED] WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE.

4. TRAVEL AND HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY HEADQUARTERS  
[REDACTED]

5. ITINERARY.

DATE

CITY.

24 APRIL  
25 APRIL  
26 APRIL  
27 APRIL  
28 APRIL  
30 APRIL  
02 MAY  
02 MAY

3  
11/19

[REDACTED]
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PAGE ONE OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY

~~SECRET~~

15 MAY

16 MAY

17 MAY

18 MAY

19 MAY


20 MAY

21 MAY

22 MAY

23 MAY

24 MAY



DAYS A/L)

~~SECRET~~

3

(10)  
11.11

063012

~~SECRET~~

CONFIRMED INTRACYTOLOGIC EXAMINATIONS  
REF ID: A2  
24 APR  
25 APR  
26 APR

27 APR

28 MAY

29 MAY

30 MAY

31 MAY

1 JUNE

2 JUNE

~~SECRET~~

12181  
12181

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 110633Z APR 78 STAFF

F.J.T.

CITE [REDACTED] 35692

TO: [REDACTED]

1. FURTHER MY LETTERS OF 19 JANUARY AND 27 MARCH 1978 ON BUREAU [REDACTED] SECTIONS: HAVE DONE SOME STATISTICS ON OUR [REDACTED] PRODUCTION AND LISTENING OVER PAST FOUR MONTHS, I.E. SINCE LAMMI CHIN DEPARTED. FOR PERIOD JANUARY THROUGH MARCH, OUR [REDACTED] HAVE AVERAGED 840 WORDS OF TRANSLATED COPY EACH PER WORK DAY, WHILE LISTENING 1.4 HOURS EACH DAY. THAT IS, I BELIEVE, RATHER HEAVY LISTENING LOAD, AND WOULD POINT OUT THAT PRODUCTION IS FREQUENTLY DERIVED FROM LESS THAN FAIR RECEPTION. ALSO, WE HAVE HELD OUR MONITORS TO TEXTS AND EXCERPTS RATHER THAN SUMMARIES, WHICH IS MORE DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING, BUT WHICH IS BETTER TRAINING FOR NEW MONITORS.

2. I BELIEVE CURRENT COVERAGE OF 10 REGIONAL BROADCASTS A DAY IS REASONABLE, ALTHOUGH SLIGHTLY HEAVY, WORKLOAD FOR FIVE-PERSON SECTION. THIS WORKLOAD DOES NOT, HOWEVER, ALLOW [REDACTED], OUR SUPERVISION, TO DO MUCH SUPERVISING, AS SHE MUST CARRY FULL PROCESSING AND LISTENING LOAD. SHE IS, IN MY OPINION, VERY STRONG MONITOR AND EXCELLENT SUPERVISOR; IN LATTER CATEGORY I WOULD RANK HER AT LEAST EQUAL OF ANY SECTION CHIEF [REDACTED]. BELIEVE BEST WAY TO DEVELOP THIS SECTION FURTHER WOULD BE TO HIRE TWO MORE [REDACTED] MONITORS. INITIALLY, [REDACTED] WOULD SPEND MUCH TIME TRAINING RECRUITS, BUT EVENTUALLY SHE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVOTE SUFFICIENT EFFORT TO SUPERVISING SECTION. WITH SEVEN MONITORS, WE COULD ADD AT LEAST TWO MORE REGIONAL NEWSCASTS AND WE COULD PROCESS MORE ECONOMIC ITEMS WE ARE NOT NOW DOING BECAUSE OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS.

3. RECOMMEND [REDACTED] BUREAU ADD TWO [REDACTED] MONITORS TO ITS STAFF. EVEN IF YOU REJECT THIS RECOMMENDATION OR OPT TO ADD ONLY ONE MONITOR, STILL FAVOR MOVING AHEAD NOW WITH ACQUIRING TWO CATEGORY III POSITIONS, AS DETAILED IN MY LETTER OF 27 MARCH.

E2, IMPDET.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 110435Z APR 78 STAFF

SITE [REDACTED] 35686

TO: FBIS, [REDACTED]

REF: FBIS 06190 AND [REDACTED] 18785  
[REDACTED]

1. WE WILL, AS WE HAVE DONE ON OCCASION IN THE PAST,  
CONSULT WITH [REDACTED] ON PROBLEMS [REDACTED] TRANSLATIONS.

2. IN ADDITION, RECOMMEND [REDACTED] KEEP A CLOSE  
EYE ON OUR TRANSLATIONS AND THAT HE CHECK ANY SUSPECT ONES  
AGAINST RECORDINGS, SOME OF WHICH [REDACTED] CAN MAKE AND  
OF WHICH WE WILL GLADLY SUPPLY ON REQUEST. IN ADDITION TO  
SUSPECTED SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS, WE WOULD WELCOME [REDACTED]  
COMMENTS FROM HIS LONG EXPERIENCE ON ANY ASPECT OF OUR  
TRANSLATIONS. WOULD SUGGEST HE INITIATE A DIALOGUE BY LETTER  
WITH [REDACTED]. HE CAN ALSO, OF COURSE COMMUNICATE WITH  
EDITORS OR WITH ME IF HE WISHES. E2, IMPDET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Henry Chan

TECHNICAL NOTES ON DEVELOPMENT OF  
CHINESE COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

The ideal strategic order of battle analyst would be a linguist of the country concerned, cryptographer, strategist, and tactician, with command and staff experience and first-hand knowledge of the land, people, and customs, and a student of the political, economic, and social forces at work in the country. He must, moreover, possess three "eyes" -- i.e., Intelligence, Imagination, and Initiative. Intelligence includes the ability to think conceptually and a highly retentive memory. Imagination includes insight and premonitory or intuitive reasoning. Initiative includes a strong desire to "dig in" and get at the facts.

In the exploitation of open documentary materials for order of battle intelligence, however, it can be stated that the linguistic factor assumes greater importance since all the other aspects can only be brought to bear through the correct analysis of documentary materials which have been screened, it can be assumed, by competent security personnel reviewing the information from the military censorship point of view.

In this context, it is noted that Chinese Communist military terminology used in open material, though often vague or obscure, has standard usage and definition. This is necessary in order to communicate with the readership and yet maintain a degree of security.

Despite this simple fact, usefulness of open documentary materials to the U.S. intelligence community is beclouded by the unfortunate circumstance that most order of battle specialists are not Chinese linguists and, therefore, must rely on translations of Chinese materials. This, in turn, leads to another beclouding factor in that the translators are not order of battle specialists and, therefore, are not fully capable of accurately translating military terms with the proper meaning in the proper context. Consequently, English renditions of Chinese Communist

military terms vary according to the translator and even by individual translators due to the large number of Chinese Communist military terms. This paper presents a study of the connotations and nuances of selected Chinese Communist military terms, based on experience from working on open Chinese Communist documentary material for strategic order of battle intelligence. It is hoped that some semblance of standardization will result in the intelligence community, raising the quality of order of battle intelligence.

1. Tsung-pu (4920/6752):

Tsung-pu is the abbreviated form of tsung-szu-ling-pu (4920/0674/CIO9/6752), which means, according to its ideograph, general headquarters. In the reorganization of the military system in the fall of 1954, however, the Chinese Communists abolished the general headquarters and the position of commander in chief. Therefore, the translation of tsung-pu into English as general headquarters is no longer wholly accurate. The term "Tsung-pu" as currently used in the CPLA is the shortened form of Tsung-ts'an-mou-pu (4920/0639/6180/6752) (General Staff Department), Tsung-cheng-chih-pu (4920/2398/3112/6752) (General Political Department), or Tsung-hou-chin-pe (4920/0603/0530/6752) (General Rear Services Department). Therefore, when the abbreviated term "Tsung-pu," is noted, it is appropriate to consider the term as representing one or all of the above-mentioned departments.

2. Ling-tao chi-kuan (7325/1418/2623/7070):

Ling-tao chi-kuan, which means leading organ or leadership organ, is a term used by the Chinese Communists apparently to obscure the nature of the unit involved. It is used commonly and loosely as a generic term for organs which assume military and political command functions of military units. It can well be a catchall phrase for the writer who does not bother to be specific. It is not used as part of a proper noun.

3. Chih-hui-pu (2172/2264/6752):

Chih-hui-pu is frequently translated as headquarters, which in the strict sense of the word means the temporary or permanent location

of the commanding officer in station, camp, or elsewhere. However, the dual command system of the Chinese Communist military forces makes the use of the term headquarters inappropriate. It is believed that the word command would be a better interpretation; e.g., Fu-chien Front Command, which encompasses both military and political command functions. In the analysis of information containing this term, one should, therefore, keep in mind the definition of this term which encompasses the organ that assumes military command and the organ that assumes political command and that these organs in turn command the subordinate military units. Chih-hui-pu is always used as part of a proper noun.

4. Ssu-ling-pu (0674/0189/3752):

Ssu-ling-pu, which is translated into English as headquarters, is often used by the Chinese Communists to designate the military command function as distinguished from the political command function. This specific designation for military command is used in military decrees which are issued jointly by the Ssu-ling-ko and the Cheng-ko (political department [command]). When this term is used in this context, the rendition of it into English as headquarters is incorrect. Only when the Ssu-ling-pu and Cheng-ko are referred to collectively as Ssu-ling-pu can the term be translated correctly as headquarters. A close analysis of the information may reveal which one of the two versions is being used.

5. Chih-chan-yuan (2172/2069/0765):

The correct translation of this term is commanders and officers but this term is very often erroneously translated only as officers. The basis of this definition is found in the Chin Min (New Chinese Communist Encyclopedia) published in 1956.

6. Shou-chang (745/7022):

As a security measure of changes in assignments of key information officers, the Chinese Communists use the term shou-chang (commander-in-chief). In these instances,

Frequently addressed with the title shou-chang (the aspiration mark in shou indicates chief; the term is used to mean head or chief).  
This title may be translated as commander, commanding officer, chief of staff, senior officer, and other similar renditions. Since this term is subject to a wide range of choices in translation, a study was made of the relationship between the term shou-chang and officer personalities whose positions were known. This study revealed that the term shou-chang is used only when certain categories of personalities are being identified. These key categories number eight, as follows: commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff-in other words those who have command or staff functions; and political commissar (commander), deputy political commissar (commander), director of political department, and director of political department - those who have political command or staff functions. As a result of this study, it was determined that shou-chang would be best rendered into English as high-ranking. All other English version of this term would be misleading, although not necessarily linguistically inaccurate.

In this connection, shou-chang is frequently used in conjunction with names of military regions to identify key personalities. The crux of the problem in these instances is to interpret correctly the generic part other than shou-chang, the interpretation of which remains constant. For example, the following combinations frequently occur (Shen-yang Military Region is used at random):

a. Shen-yang chun-ch'u shou-chang: Chun-ch'u (6511/0575). means military region or military district; therefore, the translation of this term is high-ranking leader of Shen-yang Military Region (District). Whether region or district should be used depends, among other factors upon knowledge of the administrative structure of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. The Chinese Communists have divided the chun-ch'u into first and second classes. In the case of the first class, it is recognized in the intelligence community that region should be used; while second class should be translated district to differentiate

between the two. When the Chinese Communists refer to the first class Chun-ch'u, the name of the city or province (autonomous region) in which the chun-ch'u command is located precedes the term chun-ch'u; therefore, chun-ch'u in this case should be translated as military region.

b. Chu Shen-yang pu-tui shou-chang: Chu means to be stationed at. Pu-tui (6752/7130) is the Chinese equivalent for unit. Thus the phrase high-ranking leader of CPLA units stationed in the Shen-yang Military Region would be, intelligencewise, the best translation of Chu Shen-yang pu-tui shou-chang. Since all CPLA units stationed within a military region are under the control of the military region command, the use of the plural form for unit would be necessary.

c. Shen-yang ti-ch'u pu-tui shou-chang: Ti-ch'u (0966/0575) could be translated as region, district, or area. However, ti-ch'u is sometimes erroneously interpreted as municipality and pu-tui as garrison units with the following result: High-ranking leader of garrison units in Shen-yang Municipality, when the correct interpretation should be high-ranking leader of CPLA units stationed in Shen-yang Military Region. Needless to say, the location of a unit can be falsely established or be muddled from faulty translation. The word order used by the Chinese Communists to express units located in a municipality is as follows: chu plus place name plus unit code designation or mou-pu (2673/6752). Mou-pu means certain unit and is used to obscure unit identification.

d. Shen-yang chu-chun shou-chang: Chu-chun (7465/6511) armed forces located, and not garrison units as it is sometimes translated. Hence, Shen-yang chu-chun shou-chang should be translated as high-ranking leader of CPLA units located in the Shen-yang Military Region.

In addition to the use of the shou-chang for key military personalities of organs and units, the chi-ting-tao-jen (7325/1) and fu-tse-jen (6298/6307/0087) are also used by the Chinese Communists.

The former term literally means a person in the same leadership and can be interpreted as a person in the shou-chang category or a responsible leader (see above). The latter term literally means a responsible person and can be interpreted as a person in the shou-chang category or a responsible

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ranking general staff officer. The proper rendition may be determined

by the context.

(5752)

is the abbreviated form for pu-tui (unit). The character pu by itself is also used to denote a department or subdepartment of a staff organ. The context of the information is generally sufficient to indicate which usage is being applied. It is also noted that when pu is used as the abbreviated form for pu-tui, the unit involved is of a divisional or higher level. Infrequently, it may refer to a regimental-level unit, but never has it been noted to indicate a battalion or lower unit.

#### SUMMARY

In the development of strategic order of battle intelligence is based, for various reasons, upon the exploitation of open documentary material. The fine art of determining nuances, connotations, and denotations in a foreign language assumes greater significance than usual.

In the case of Chinese Communist military terminology, the art is made all the more difficult since military security plays a major role in the Chinese Communists utilization and creation of terms used in open source materials. However, some standards can be developed since the necessity for communicating to the Chinese Communist readership prevents the complete use of equivocal terms by the authorities. With this frame of reference, terms can then be interpreted correctly and consistently into English equivalents. Therefore, painstaking research and imagination can help to light up the cryptic world of Chinese Communist military terms used in open documents.

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ACTION: RUEK  
INPUT: EAPZCH-4, EAPZCPSG, EAPZSH-4, OOPS-S, FILE.  
REF: DODNNN, OPAZAKERS, OPAZII-2, CEX-3, CHZFS, CTS, UZFHIS-2, DCD-3,  
EA-5, EPSZEG-2, IAD/CAS-3, IAD/IC, NFAC/ZCH, NIZU/ZCH, DEH-3, RES/ARU,  
STUZ/CSTU, (34/\*)

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DE RUMJPG 49572/1 2740151  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 290535Z SEP 80  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7308  
INFO RUEHOK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2036  
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 818  
RUMJDR/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3980  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MSSCOW 2161  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 988  
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI POUCH  
RUEHIN/ATT TAIPEI  
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6657  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 120651 GOS 9/29/86 (ROY, J. STAPLETON) OR-M  
TAGS: PINT, CH  
SUBJECT: WHICH WAY OUT, CHAIRMAN HUA?

REFDS: (A) SHANGHAI 696 (B) BEIJING 9519; (C) HUNG KONG 12363  
(D) HUNG KONG 15909

1. [REDACTED] SUMMARY: A RECENT ESSAY ON LEADERSHIP HAS MAPPED  
THE IDEOLOGICAL HIGH ROAD FOR A MOVE TO OUST HUA GUOFENG.  
AS PARTY CHAIRMAN, WHILE AN EXPOSE OF A SHANXI MIS-  
CARRIAGE OF JUSTICE HAS GIVEN HUA'S PURSUERS THE DIRT  
THEY NEED TO CHASE HIM DOWN THE LOW ROAD.  
THE ARTICLES SUGGEST AN ESCALATION OF EFFORTS  
TO REMOVE HUA AT THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS. END SUMMARY.

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2. [ ] THE HIGH ROAD, LI HONGLIN (2621/3153/2651) IS A SOCIAL SCIENCE ACADEMY HISTORIAN WHO DOES THEORETICAL WORK FOR THE PARTY CENTRAL PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT. HAS PUBLISHED A LONG ESSAY ENTITLED "LEADER AND PEOPLE" IN THE SEPTEMBER 18 AND 19 PEOPLE'S DAILY (REF 0). LI, WHO HAS LAUNCHED VEILED ATTACKS ON MAO ZEDONG IN PRINT BEFORE, IMPLICITLY CHARACTERIZES HIM AS A FEUDAL EMPEROR AND ACCIDENT OF HISTORY. MAO VIOLATED CARDINAL MARXIST PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AND HUMILITY BEFORE THEM, LI SAYS, AND HE SUGGESTS THAT HUA GUOFENG HAS IMITATED MAO.

3. [ ] MAKING EXPLICIT THE HINTS OF AUGUST'S "MEUNUCHI" ALLEGORIES (REF B), LI'S ESSAYS QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF HUA'S PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP. LI IS CLEARLY ASSERTING THAT MAO HAD NO RIGHT TO NOMINATE HUA AS HIS SUCCESSOR; AND TO THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT HUA WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN IN THE "NORMAL" WAY, HE IMPLIES THAT THE OCTOBER 1976 POLITBURO WAS ITSELF ABNORMALLY CONSTITUTED. FURTHER, LI REBUTS THE ARGUMENT THAT HUA MUST REMAIN CHAIRMAN TO GUARANTEE PARTY UNITY: "IF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP CAN BE MAINTAINED, THEN THE DEPARTURE OF ONE PARTICULAR LEADING FIGURE CANNOT AT ALL AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE LEADERSHIP GROUP; THAT IS, IT CANNOT AFFECT PEACE AND UNITY." FINALLY, LI IMPLIES THAT HUA REMAINS CULPABLE OF PERPETUATING THE PERSONALITY COULT -- THAT MARK OF "FEUDAL AND FASCIST SYSTEMS" -- SEEN JUST DAYS AGO IN "THE MUD WALL VILLAGE HUA GUOFENG COMMEMORATION HALL" (REF A).

4. [ ] THE DAY AFTER LI'S ESSAY APPEARED, THE SEPT 20 DR. GUANGMING RIBAO RECOUNTED "THE STRANGE INJUSTICE OF TAIHANG," THE STORY OF COMRADE YUE ZHEGSHOU'S (1471/1073/1108) WRONGFUL PROSECUTION AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO SET IT RIGHT. COMRADE YUE, AN ELECTRICIAN WORKING NEAR THE DAZHAI MODEL COMMUNE, HAD WRITTEN THREE LETTERS TO CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER ZHOU BEFORE THEIR DEATHS, AND NINE LETTERS TO HUA GUOFENG AND YE JIANYING AFTER THE OCTOBER 1976 ARREST OF THE GANG OF FOUR. THE SERIES OF LETTERS BEGAN WITH YUE'S ACCUSATION THAT THE "FORMER PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF XIYANG

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COUNTY" ONLY CHEN YUNGGUI FITS THE BILL AND CONCEALED THE ILLEGAL RELEASE FROM PRISON, RESTORATION OF BACK PAY AND PROMOTION FOR HIS WIFE'S FORMER HUSBAND, WHO HAD BEEN JAILED IN 1966 FOR RAPING LITTLE GIRLS. YUE KENT ON TO EXPPOSE MISMANAGEMENT AND FALSE PRODUCTION CLAIMS AT DAZHAI AND TO DESCRIBE FOR THE CENTRAL LEADERS HOW DAZHAI'S PEASANTS HAD COME TO SUFFER UNDER CHEN YUNGGUI'S CAPRICE. ONE LETTER TO HUA AND YE DESCRIBED CHEN'S CONNECTIONS WITH THE GANG OF FOUR WHEN CHAIRMAN MAO WAS SICK. WHY DID JIANG QING GO NOT TO DAQING, BUT TO DAZHAI TO PLOT? THE FLY ALWAYS FLIES TO THE FILTHIEST PLACE! AT THAT TIME, THE FORMER RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF XIYANG COUNTRY ACCOMPANIED JIANG QING TO DAZHAI AND EN ROUTE PLAYED POKER!

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5. [REDACTED] FOR HIS EFFORTS TO REPORT CHEN YUNGGUI'S MISPRISON OF JUSTICE AND TO EXPOSE GANG OF FOUR ABBERRATIONS, COMRADE YUE WAS ARRESTED ON DEC 22, 1976, CRIPPLED BY POLICE BEATINGS, TRIED AND SENTENCED TO 18 YEARS IN JAIL FOR "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES." NEARLY SEVENTY FRIENDS AND FAMILY MEMBERS WHO HAD AIDED HIM OR PROTESTED HIS ARREST WERE "STRUGGLED" FIRED FROM THEIR JOBS OR "INVESTIGATED" UNTO DYSFUNCTION. YUE'S ELDER BROTHER'S REPEATED APPEALS IN BEIJING LED TO HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL IN LATE FEBRUARY 1979. BUT THE SHANXI LOCAL MAGISTRACY AND PARTY COMMITTEE REFUSED TO REHABILITATE HIM OR THE OTHERS TAINTED BY THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH YUE. ONLY AFTER SHANXI PROVINCIAL PARTY OFFICIALS GOT WIND OF THE GUANGMING DAILY'S REPORT DID THEY ORDER YUE'S LOCAL MAGISTRATE TO REHABILITATE HIM; AND YUE WAS FINALLY REHABILITATED (PENGFAN ZHAUXUE) LATE LAST MONTH.

6. [REDACTED] THE SUNDAY, SEPT 21 PEOPLE'S DAILY RECAPTITULATED THE PREVIOUS DAY'S GUANGMING STORY FOR ITS NATIONAL AUDIENCE AND ADDED THIS FINAL CHAPTER: YUE ZHEGSHOU HAD FILED SUIT IN SHANXI SUPERIOR COURT ON SEPT 7, MASKING THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS INJUSTICE BE BROUGHT TO THE LAW."

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[REDACTED] COMMENT LI HUNGLING'S ESSAY AND THE PAIR OF [REDACTED] ARTICLES ON THE YUE ZHENGSHOU CASE ARE TIRES OF [REDACTED] "FORK." IF LI'S TIGHT-KNIT PROSE GIVES THE [REDACTED] REASONED ARGUMENTS FOR HUA'S DISMISSAL FROM THE PARTY [REDACTED] CHAIR, THE SHANXI SCANDAL PROVIDES THE DIRT. FOR HUA [REDACTED] AND WE ARE UNMISTAKENLY IMPLICATED IN PROTECTING CHEN [REDACTED] QUYU. SEVERAL KNOWLEDGEABLE CHINESE HAVE TOLD US --- [REDACTED] AT THIS LATEST SHANXI SCANDAL "WILL PROBABLY HAVE [REDACTED] OTHER DEVELOPMENTS."

END OF MESSAGE

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